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Security: the blocked remainder

Targets net10.0 csharp-14Last reviewed 2026-09-25Sources andrew-lock barry-dorrans code-with-mukesh ms-learn

Unresolved research. This topic is evidence that research-topic gathered, waiting on resolve-research. It isn't an opinion, and it can cite unvetted material. Follow the opinions instead.

Partially promoted on 2026-09-25. Git history keeps the topic's two passes, from 2026-09-11 and 2026-09-12, at research/security.md. Everything they sourced is now opinion. What's left here is what no citable source can support yet, and each item says what would unblock it.

What promoted

Went to What
opinions/security.md, new file Secrets, deserialization, the GA cryptography set with AES-GCM nonce handling, password hashing through Identity, post-quantum gated on IsSupported, and servicing cadence
opinions/aspnet-core-security.md The passkey amr caveat, the authorization fallback policy, cookies and BFF, tokens for APIs including DPoP, PAR, and client assertions, the Data Protection key ring, CORS, security headers, open redirects, and the form-binding antiforgery rule
opinions/aspnet-core.md Non-root containers, and TLS ownership behind a proxy
opinions/ci.md NuGet Audit under the warnings rule, package source mapping, and trusted publishing instead of an API key
opinions/data-access.md Parameterised raw SQL: interpolated methods only, and never a *Raw method with input
templates/Directory.Build.props NU1901 to NU1904 failing restore on purpose. #123 had already reframed the lock file as a content pin, not drift protection.

Still blocked on a source

API key authentication. code-with-mukesh asks for "at least 128 bits of entropy, ideally 256 bits. Generated with RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes()". It also asks for storage "as SHA-256 hashes, never plaintext", and comparison with CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals. (Mukesh: API Key Authentication in ASP.NET Core (.NET 10), 2026-05-08) The advice is mechanical and looks right, but that ID is marked Corroborate., so it can't support the claim alone. milan-jovanovic's 2023 post covers neither hashing nor comparison, and damien-bowden doesn't write about custom API key authentication (negative result, 2026-09-12). Unblocked by: a second citable source on hashing and comparing API keys.

Which security analyzer rules to enable. AnalysisModeSecurity sets the analysis mode for the Security category alone, and otherwise inherits AnalysisMode. (Microsoft Learn: MSBuild reference for .NET SDK projects, reviewed 2026-03-27) The template's latest-recommended turns on some security rules. The documentation doesn't list which, and points at the SDK's analysislevel_*_recommended.globalconfig instead. No source in either pass recommends a setting. Unblocked by: a source that recommends a level or names the rules, so this repository doesn't invent one.

SBOM and provenance. andrew-lock is the only citable coverage. Three posts, from 2025-03 to 2025-04, cover generating an SBOM, provenance attestations, and signed SBOM attestations with actions/attest-sbom. ms-learn has no page on SBOM generation for .NET builds, and damien-bowden doesn't cover supply chain (both negative results). No source says who consumes the SBOM, which is the question an opinion would have to answer. barry-dorrans covers exactly this, and is on the watch list until idunno.org has been a blog for two years, on 2027-11-18. Unblocked by: that date, or another citable source.

The PBKDF2 iteration count. opinions/security.md sends password hashing to Identity's hasher, at its default of 100,000 iterations. It leaves the count for a hand-rolled derivation to each application. damien-bowden's 2024 floor of "more than 10000 iterations" is an order of magnitude lower, and no roster source states a current figure for .NET 10. The OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet prefers Argon2id, which is unvetted and not in the BCL, so it changed nothing. Unblocked by: a roster source that states a figure for .NET 10.

Waiting on a release, not a source

  • .NET 11 GA, expected November 2026: The CSRF note in aspnet-core-security.md becomes the opinion, and the CORS allowed-origins list becomes part of CSRF configuration. The CSP-compliant Virtualize component removes the .NET 8 to 10 conflict recorded under security headers. This is for refresh-dotnet-versions.
  • CheckSdkVulnerabilities: ms-learn documents the property, and warning NETSDK1239 for an end-of-life SDK. (Microsoft Learn: .NET releases, patches, and support, reviewed 2026-05-15) The installed 10.0.400 SDK doesn't reference it, NETSDK1238, or NETSDK1240. Adopt it when an SDK this repository pins includes it.
  • .NET 8 and 9 end of support, 2026-11-10: opinions/security.md records the date. After it, review-project should report either target framework as a finding.

A lead for vet-source

On the Duende blog, the passkey and antiforgery deep dives have Maarten Balliauw's byline, not Khalid's, so the wider khalid scope doesn't reach them. He has a long personal publishing record that nobody here has examined. This repository's passkeys opinion rests on a single source, so run vet-source on him, on the same terms that admitted Khalid's byline instead of the publication.